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I would like to organize my corrments on 
the moral and legal issues having to do with 
animals by asking two fundamental questions: 
Should animals have moral standing, and 
Should animals have legal standing? 
Since most of my research has been in 
the area of moral philosophy and very little 
in the philosophy of law, I will have more to 
say in regard to the first question than in 
relation to the second. 
Let us consider the first question: 
Should animals have moral standing? What 
would it be for an animal not to have moral 
standing, not to count for anything morally 
whatsoever? Consider an example: Joe gets 
his kicks out of clubbing calves. He just 
loves to smash the heads of calves. To say 
that the calves have no moral standing would 
be to say that they count for nothing moral­
ly. It would mean that Joe does nothing 
wrong as far as the calves themselves are 
concernedi although physically damaged, the 
calves could not be morally harmed, they 
could not be morally injured. The calves 
would not be the subjects of interests which 
could in any way be violated. And if Joe did 
all of his head smashing on a deserted island 
with no other"hUIll3D. beings around to either 
see or hear about these clubbings, Joe's 
actions would, from the moral standpoint, be 
completely neutral. They would be what we 
might call "amoral," that is, without any 
moral significance whatsoever. 
The history of Western culture and phil­
osophy reveals a very persistent tendency to 
say "no" to the question: Should animals 
have moral standing? The Greeks, including 
Plato and especially Aristotle, said "no": on 
the basis of the criterion of rationality. 
Only rational beings are to count for some­
thing morally. Only hUIll3D.s are rational. 
Animals are not rational. Therefore, animals 
should count for nothing morally, and animals 
should be used as instruments to serve the 
interest of rational hUIll3D.s. Aristotle him­
self was quite rational, but he was also 
convinced that many hUIll3D.s were not rational 
or, at least, not very rational, especially 
female humans and slave humans. so, he ra­
tionally drew the conclusion that both sexism 
and slavery were justified. 
Not only within the Greek philosophical 
tradition but also within orthodox Christian­
ity, there has been a persistent denial of 
the moral standing of animals. The most 
prominent and clear example was in the thir­
teenth century: st. Thomas Aquinas. Blend­
ing Aristotelianism with the daninion theory 
of the Bible, Aquinas claimed that by divine 
providence the animals are intended for human 
use, and, therefore, it is not wrong for 
hUIll3D.s to make use of animals, either by 
killing or in any other way whatever. True, 
St. Thomas was against cruelty to animals. 
But the only reason, or at least the basic 
reason, he was against cruelty was that if 
humans are cruel to animals, then they will, 
he thought, as a matter of fact, tend to be 
cruel to other human beings • Given that Joe 
smashes calves' heads on a deserted island, 
Aquinas would be canmitted to the view that 
nothing wrong is done to the calves. The 
action would be morally indifferent as far as 
the calves are concerned. 
In the seventeenth century, the influen­
tial French philosopher Rene Descartes cate­
gorically denied that animals should have any 
moral standing. Since animals are soulless, 
are mindless machines, as mechanical as 
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clocks, it is impossible that animals could 
be hurt. When Joe clubs calves, they feel no 
IlOre pain that does a clock when it is 
smashed. Calves have no awareness, no con­
sciousness, no ability to experience either 
pain or pleasure. It follows, then, that it 
is impossible that an animal could be IlOrally 
hanned or benefitted. 
Another Western philosoI,iler of enorllOus 
influence was the eighteenth century Gennan, 
Imnanuel Kant. His philosophy has been espe­
cially important in developing the foundation 
for human rights. For example, the human 
right to life, the human right not to be 
hanned, the human right to freedom. Kant 
claimed that only rational, self-conscious 
human beings counted for anything IlOrally. 
Kant is fallOus for his Categorical Impera­
tive, which goes something like this: ra­
tional self-conscious human beings should 
always be treated as ends in themselves and 
never as mere means, never as mere instru­
mental resources. All other beings, includ­
ing all animals, could and should be used as 
mere means to serve the interest of the self­
conscious, rational humans. To be sure, Kant 
was against cruelty to animals--but for ex­
actly the same reasons given by St. Thomas. 
Cruelty to animals, he thought, would have a 
tendency to result in humans being cruel to 
humans. For example, the clubbed calves 
counted for nothing whatever IlOrally in and 
of themselves. And on a deserted island, 
Joe's head-smashing activities would be can­
pletely aIlOral as far as the calves are con­
cerned, without any IlOral significance what­
soever. 
There are other theories which have an­
swered "no" to our first question, but we do 
not have time to explore them. Let us take a 
look at the theories which say "yes" to the 
question: Should animals have IlOral 
standing? These two theories are utilitari­
anism and the IlOral right theory. These two 
theories are both negative and positive. 
They are negative in that they criticize the 
former theories which deny any IlOral stand­
ing to animals, and they are positive in that 
they· attempt to provide theories which will 
serve as a basis for giving IlOral standing to 
animals. 
Let us first briefly consider criticisms 
of the past "no-sayers." Aristotle's ration­
ality criterion is both too narrow and too 
broad. It is too narrow in that human in­
fants and severely retarded humans are not 
rational, but we are convinced that human 
infants and the severely retarded should 
count for something IlOrally. It is too broad 
in that behavioral and ecological studies are 
leading to the conclusion that many animals 
have some rational capacity. 
Psychologist David Premack has given 
serious consideration to the hypothesis that 
primates have the concept of causality and 
that they make inferences on the basis of 
this concept. [I] St. Thomas Aquinas' theory, 
being a theological theory, has all the weak­
nesses that theological theories, finally 
based on faith, have. They can produce no 
rational grounds for accepting. the theory • 
Other religions have recognized the IlOral 
standing of animals, for example, Buddhism 
and Hinduism. Which re~igion is correct? 
And even if one were to accept the theologic­
al dominion theory, the view that humans were 
given rule over the animals, there are two 
opposed interpretations of the concept "do­
minion." Does "daninion" mean rule over the 
animals for the sake of humans? We might 
call this "the tyrannical interpretation" of 
dominion. Or does the concept "daninion" 
mean rule over the animals for the sake of 
the animals? We might call this "the stew­
ardship interpretation." St. Thomas gave the 
tyrannical interpretation, but there are 
contemporary theologians who argue that the 
stewardship interpretation is rrbre correct. 
Or, consider Imnanuel Kant's theory' 
based on rationality and self-consciousness. 
This has also been criticized as being both 
too narrow and too broad. His theory would 
result in two-week old human infants and 
severely retarded humans counting for nothing 
IlOrally. This criterion is too broad--from 
the perspective of anthropocentric tradition 
--in that i·t would give IlOral standing to 
many animals. 
The I,ililosoI,ilers Peter Singer [ 2] and Tan 
Regan[3] have effectively argued that many 
animals are capable of intentional behavior 
and that intentional behavior necessitates 
some self-consciousness, at least an aware­
ness of oneself as being distinct from other 
things in the environment, and also awareness 
of oneself as enduring through time, past, 
present, and future. 
Descartes' machine theory of animals has 
been heavily and decisively, I believe, cri­
ticized by both scientists and philosophers. 
Given the silllilarities of the nerve and brain 
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structures and in behaviors of animals and 
humans, there is strong evidence to reject 
the Cartesian theory. Evolutionists empha­
size the survival value implicit in the capa­
city to experience pleasure and pain. How 
could pain and pleasure have survival value 
if the animals experience no pain or plea­
sure? 
Having briefly considered the criticisms 
of the "no-saying" theories, let us now take 
a look at the two kinds of theories held by 
those who say "yes" to the question: Should 
animals have m::>ral standing? 
First, utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham 
(eighteenth and nineteenth century, English) 
and John stuart Mill (nineteenth century, 
English, and a follower of Bentham) systema­
tically developed the classical utilitarian 
theory. The fundamental themes of utilitari­
anism include the following: 
All and only pleasure is good in and of 
itself. 
All and only pain is bad or evil in and 
of itself; 
In all their actions, m::>ral agents 
should act in such a way as to maximize the 
net balance of pleasure over pain for all 
sentient beings in any way affected by the 
action. 
Using these fundamental utilitarian princi­
pIes, Jeremy Bentham wrote the often-quoted 
sentence: 
The question is not can animals 
reason, not can they talk or use 
language, but can they suffer? can 
they enjoy? 
Bentham answered these last questions, ~ 
they suffer?, ~ they enjoy?, affinnatively. 
John stuart Mill agreed with him, and Peter 
Singer, the internationally respected philo­
sopher and author of Animal Liberation[4], is 
in fundamental agreement with Bentham and 
Mill. 
The m::>ral theory underpinning Peter 
Singer's argument in his very influential 
Animal Liberation is utilitarianism. All 
animals are equal, argues Singer; that is, 
equal pains in animals and humans should 
count equally m::>rally. And equal pleasures 
in animals and humans should also count 
equally m::>rally. Therefore, all sentient 
animals (by "sentient animals," I mean ani­
mals having the capacity to experience pain 
and pleasure) do have m::>ral standing. 
Singer concludes that the net balance of 
pleasure over pain for all sentient beings-­
human and nonhuman--affected on this planet 
would be maximized if the factory farming of 
food animals were discontinued and if humans 
switched from a factory farmed animal diet to 
a vegetarian diet. Singer also concludes 
that the elimination of m::>st of the current 
experimentation on animals would maximize the 
net balance of pleasure over pain for all 
sentient beings--once again, human and nonhu­
man--affected. For the utilitarian, Joe's 
activity of smashing calves' heads on a de­
serted island would be an action with m::>ral 
significance, or perhaps better, ilrmoral 
significance. All calves and all sentient 
animals COtmt for something m::>rally, have 
IOC>ral standing, according to utilitarian 
theory. 
A m::>ral rights theory is a still strong­
er theory answering "yes" to the question: 
Should animals have m::>ral standing? The 
concept of m::>ral rights is a fairly rrodern 
concept, performing sane of the functions of 
the older "natural rights" concept, but with 
an attempt to eliminate some of the historic­
al and conceptual connection between natural 
right and early Greek and Ronan metaphysical 
views. Also, an attempt is made to stay away 
from a theological foundation which has been 
stressed as a basis for natural rights. 
There is much controversy currently over 
the question of m::>ral rights, not only at the 
level of animal !!Oral rights but also in 
regard to human moral rights. The following 
examples are frequently presented as being 
strong candidates for moral rights: 
the right to life, 
the right not to be harmed, and 
the right to freedom. 
Moral rights theorists call our attention to 
the faIIDUS passage in the Declaration of 
Independence: 
All men are created equal. They 
are endowed by their creator with 
certain inalienable rights. AIlOng 
these rights are life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness. 
In this passage, we can detect three thanes 
in relation to IOC>ral rights: 
Moral rights are universal; that is, 
they apply to all humans, regardless of time 
or place. 
Moral rights are equal; that is, if any 
two beings have moral rights, they possess 
them equally--you cannot have !!Ore or less of 
a !!Oral right to life than I do. 
Moral rights are inalienable, that is, 
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they cannot be transferred fran or sold or 
given away. 
It is controversial how best to define a 
nnral right. I would like to suggest, preli­
minarily, the following definition: 
to say that a being S has a nnral right 
to x means that S has a valid claim to x, a 
claim which is enforceable against others in 
virtue of moral sanctions and principles. [5] 
Ronald Dworkin, in his book Taking 
Rights SeriouslY, [6] eInJ;i1asizes that nnral 
rights serve as a trump card over and against 
the collective utilitarian interests of the 
group. If this is so, then we can easily see 
that if animals have nnral rights, then it 
would follow that animals have nnral standing 
in a sigm.ficantly stronger sense than would 
be the case under utilitarianism. 
In 1983, the University of California 
Press released The Case for Animal Rights by 
'Ibm Regan, Professor of Philosofhy at North 
Carolina state Uhiversity. [7] This book is 
by far the nnst extensive, systematic, and 
sofhisticated argument for animal rights to 
appear thus far. 
Regan claims that humans do have moral 
rights, including the right to life, the 
right to freedcm, and the right not to be 
harmed. The nnst plausible criterion for 
nnral rights possession by humans is a cri7" 
terion also met by nnst animals. Therefore, 
he draws the conclusion that nnst animals, 
all mamnals, perhaps all birds, have nnral 
rights. That's the structure of his argu­
ment. 
Regan's arguments are both negative and 
positive. He has negative arguments criti­
cizing past and canpeting criteria for the 
possession of nnral rights. His positive 
arguments are presented in defense of the 
criterion which he accepts. In answer to 
those who claim that rights are based on a 
divine gift, Regan shows that such a claim 
can have no rational evidence, since it is 
ultimately based only on faith. In answer to 
those who attempt to base rights on the capa­
city to use language, Regan argues that this 
criterion will exclude many humans fran 
rights (infants and the severely retarded) 
and will include sane animals (ch:irnpanzees, 
orangutans, gorillas, porpoises, etc.). In 
answer to those who attempt to base rights on 
the capacity to reason, Regan again argues 
that this will leave out many humans and will 
include sane animals. In answer to those who 
try to ground rights on the ability to choose 
freely, Regan concludes that this, too, will 
exclude many humans and include many animals. 
And in answer to those who use the criterion 
of self-consciousness, Regan argues that 
this, too, excludes many humans and includes 
many animals. Regan's general negative con­
clusion is that it is impossible to develop a 
rational, consistent criterion for nnral 
rights which will include all humans but 
exclude all animals. 
In his positive argument, Regan develops 
what he considers to be the nnst adequate 
criterion to serve as a basis for possessing 
nnral rights. In sUlllllaIy form, this criteri­
on is as follows: 
a being which has inherent value has 
nnral rights. and any being has inherent 
value if it satisfies the following three 
conditions: 
such a being has interests; 
such a being can be benefitted or 
hanned; and 
such a being is the subject of a life 
which can be better or worse for it, indepen­
dently of any other being valuing it or find­
ing it to be useful. 
Regan canes to the conclusion that this nnst 
satisfactory basis for nnral rights will 
include virtually all humans (the status of a 
pennanently ccmatose individual, like Karen 
Ann Quinlan, is left an open question) but it 
will also include nnst ani.mals: all nonnal, 
mature mamnals, probably all normal, mature 
birds, and probably still others. And as far 
as human treatment of animals is concerned, 
Regan concludes that vegetarianism is nnrally 
obligatory, and that the elimination of ex­
perimentation which harms animals is also 
nnrally obligatory. Therefore, it follows 
that Joe's smashing calves' heads on the 
d;eserted island would be violating the 
calves' nnral rights: the right to life, the 
right not to be hanned, and the right to 
freedan. 
Given that I am not a specialist in the 
fhilosofhy of law, IT.rf cemnents will, neces­
sarily, be brief in regard to the second 
basic question posed at the beginning of this 
discussion; Should animals have legal stand­
ing? 
First, it is important to consider two 
preliminary questions: 
Do animals already have legal rights? 
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Do animals already have legal standing? 
The Animal Welfare Institute in Washing­
ton, D.C., has recenUy published ~ book 
entiUed Animals and Their ~ Rights. [8] 
'!his tiUe seems to presume that animals 
already do have legal rights. Considered in 
this book are anti-cruelty laws and laws 
governing transportation, caging, slaughter, 
etc. These laws do give animals sane protec­
tion, but just fran the fact that laws pro­
tect sanething, it does not follow that that 
which is protected has any legal rights. For 
example, there are laws protecting the Golden 
Gate Bridge, but it does not follow that this 
bridge has any legal rights, that this bridge 
has interests which can be represented in 
legal actions. I think we must conclude that 
animals do not have any legal rights in cur­
rent American law. Nor do they have legal 
standing. 
Is legal standing for animals ever 
thinkable? Does it even make conceptual 
sense to try to talk about legal standing for 
animals, or is such talk prre nonsense? Joel 
Feinberg, a philosoIher at the University of 
Arizona, has effectively argued that such 
talk is thinkable.[9] If legal rights are to 
be essentially connected with interests and 
if it makes sense to say that a squirrel has 
interests, then why isn't it at least think­
able that a squirrel could have legal rights 
and that the interests of the squirrel could 
be represented by an agent or a guardian in a 
court of law? True, squirrels do not have 
the ability to make their own claims, but 
neither do human infants, and human infants 
do have legal rights. 
ChristoIher stone's important book, 
Should Trees Have Standing?, is relevant 
here. [10] Stone wresUes with the question: 
Is it thinkable that a forest or wilderness 
could have legal rights? Stone concludes 
that it is thinkable, because a forest could 
meet the three criteria which Stone emIha­
sizes as being sufficient for legal standing: 
a forest could institute legal action in 
its behest through a guardian; 
a court could take injury to the forest 
into account in determining the granting of 
legal relief I and 
the relief granted by the court could 
run to the benefit of the forest. 
If corporations and ships can have legal 
standing--and they do-then why could not 
forests? If legal standing is thinkable for 
a forest, then surely legal standing is 
thinkable for squirrels and dolIhins. 
What is the relationship between morals 
and lawS? More specifically, we could ask: 
What is the relationship between moral rights 
and legal rights? Between moral standing and 
legal standing? There is a popl1ar saying: 
it is impossible to legislate morality. I'm 
not sure exactly what this statement means, 
but I do think there is a sense in which this 
is a false claim. Not only do morals have a 
significant influence on law, but law also 
has a significant influence on morals. For 
exanple, consider the strong Minnesota law 
prohibiting SIlOking in public areas. I sus­
pect that the moral right not to be banned by 
others played a significant role in the pass­
age of this law. Once the law was passed, 
there was much criticism and grumbling on the 
part of the SIlOkers and eIIl?loyers and rest­
aurant owners, but this law is having a very 
noticeable effect on the moral attitudes and 
beliefs of the general public. There is a 
sense in which morals can be legislated. As 
already indicated, the Declaration of Inde­
pendence emIhasized three moral rights: 
the right to life, 
the right to liberty, 
the right to the prrsuit of hawiness. 
These moral rights have had a profound influ­
ence on American law. 
Ronald Dworkin, again in Taking Rights 
Seriously, argues that it is impossible to 
separate law fran morality. Part of his 
argument consists of his claim that it is 
impossible for judges to decide hard cases 
without appealing to moral principle, which 
are not explicit, within the laws themselves. 
The principle of justice or fairness, for 
example, is a moral principle which is often 
used to overturn certain rules that were 
expliciUy adopted by la~ bodies. In 
denying the possibility of separating morals 
fran law, Dworkin is attacking the position 
called "legal positivism:" the view which 
claims that there is no such thing as moral 
rights, that the only rights which exist are 
legal rights, those rights specifically 
adopted by legislatures and that can be found 
in statutes. 
How similar is the legal position of 
animals to the legal position of human 
slaves? I am currenUy doing preliminary 
research on a book to be entiUed Human 
Slavery and Animal Slavery. One chapter 
would deal with slavery law, the law govern­
ing human slaves and the law governing animal 
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slaves. Most people have never thought of 
the concept of "animal slavery." At first 
hearing it seems p.IZzling, but I am convinced 
that the parallel between the two types of 
slavery is very enlightening. 
Slaves, be they htnnaIl or animal, are 
property. The htnnaIl slave, being property, 
can make no contract~ neither can animal 
slaves. All animals, according to the West­
ern tradition, are owned~ even the wild ani­
mals are owned by the public. A htnnaIl slave 
cannot own property. How could property own 
property? Neither can animal slaves own 
property. A htnnaIl slave cannot testify in 
court against a non-slave. How could proper­
ty testify? Neither can an animal slave 
testify. A htnnaIl slave cannot sue the slave­
holder. How could property sue its owner? 
Neither can animal slaves sue their owners. 
In general, we can conclude that htnnaIl slaves 
have no legal standing, since they are essen­
tially property. The same conclusions hold 
for animal slaves. 
There are also important, illuminating 
parallels between the abolition of htnnaIl 
slavery and the anticipated abolition of 
animal slavery: "animal liberation." Major 
shifts in classical philosophical and theolo­
gical views were required before htnnaIl slaves 
could achieve IlDral standing. PhilosoI;bers 
are now exploring further shifts which recog­
nize the IlDral standing of animals. Theolo­
gians and clergy will find it necessary to 
re-examine and re-interpret doctrines affect­
ing the relation between htnnaIls and animals. 
Public attitudes toward animals IIUlSt--and 
will-change to the point where animal liber­
ation can become a viable political issue, 
the final result being the recognition of the 
legal standing of individual animals. 
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